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1. ANTIZIONISM AND ANTISEMITISM
So many experimental and survey-based stud-
ies have found a correlation between negative 
attitudes towards Jews and negative attitudes 
towards Israel that this may be considered one 
of the most solidly established facts of political 
psychology.3 That is unsurprising: multiple his-
torical and qualitative studies have argued for 
the existence of a manifestation of antisemitism 
which is expressed in relation to discourse about 
Israel and which may not necessarily be expressed 
against Jews qua Jews.4 If that argument is 
accepted, then it seems possible that the empir-
ical correlation between agreement with certain 
kinds of statements about Jews and agreement 
with similar attitudes about Israel may reflect a 
relationship not of causation but of identity. In 
other words, it is perhaps not that certain kinds 
of attitudes to Israel drive certain kinds of atti-
tudes to Jews, or vice versa, but that there is 
only a single social and psychological construct 
underlying both. This argument could be taken 
to suggest that much of the imperfection of the 
empirical correlation between agreement with 
classically antisemitic statements referring to 
Jews and agreement with the same statements 
once modified to refer instead to the Jewish state 
may be explained by the effects of social desir-
ability bias with regard to the expression of prej-
udice against ethnic or religious minority groups. 
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“Denial of racism” is, it has been observed, “a key 
feature of modern racism.”5 
For example, several of the items within the 
questionnaire instrument used for the 2017 
Jewish Policy Research study of attitudes to 
Jews and Israel express clearly antisemitic atti-
tudes with reference to “Israel” rather than 
“Jews.” To take perhaps the clearest example, 
the statement “Israel exploits Holocaust vic-
timhood for its own purposes” (agreed with by 
about thirteen percent of the British popula-
tion), which is part of the group of statements 
which that study uses to measure what it refers 
to as “anti-Israel attitudes,” is almost identical 
to the statement “Jews exploit Holocaust vic-
timhood for their own purposes” (agreed with 
by about ten percent of the British population), 
which is part of the group of statements which 
the same study uses to measure what it refers to 
as “antisemitic attitudes.”6 While it is obvious 
that these two groups of statements had to be 
held conceptually separate in order to answer 
that study’s central research question, which 
concerned the statistical association between 
agreement with one group and agreement with 
the other, it would be difficult to argue that the 
second of the two statements quoted here is 
any less antisemitic than the first. After all, they 
both express the same idea—albeit that one 
expresses it in relation to Jews, and the other, 
in relation to the Jewish state. Moreover, it is 
as implausible to suppose that Israel-haters will 
have taken “Israel” to refer to Israel’s non-Jewish 
inhabitants as it is to suppose that Jew-haters 
will have understood Jews’ “own purposes” to 
be unrelated to Israel. Indeed, the usual antise-
mitic claim is that Jews exploit the Holocaust 
to legitimate Israel’s existence as a Jewish state.7 
This may explain why the same study found 
“Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their 
own purposes” to be the most popular anti- 
Jewish statement among people with strong 
anti-Israeli attitudes, receiving agreement from 
a staggering forty-nine percent of the latter.8
This is not, of course, to criticize the Jewish 
Policy Research study and those similar studies 
that preceded it, which could only have been 
conducted on the methodological basis of an 
artificial distinction between statements about 
Israel and statements about Jews. Rather, it is to 
argue that the best response to those studies is to 
build on their repeated finding of correlation by 
abandoning the fiction of an essential difference 
between antisemitism and that form of antizion-
ism promoted not only by the notionally left-
wing BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) 
movement but also by right-wing extremists 
such as the white supremacist, David Duke.
This is not to say that contemporary anti- 
Israel discourse is no more than a “politically 
correct” veneer on an unchanging anti-Jew-
ish prejudice. After all, the international dele-
gitimization campaign against Israel was not 
spontaneous in emergence, but the work of 
a decentralized network of individuals and 
groups that exhibit considerable diversity with 
regard both to ideology and to objectives.9 
Nonetheless, it is clear that much of the dis-
course generated by that campaign rotates 
around a collection of tropes that should be 
instantly recognizable from earlier expressions 
of Jew-hate.10 Moreover, where negative atti-
tudes to Israel are “manifested in . . . hostility 
and violence against Jews and Jewish commu-
nities abroad,” as is often the case,11 then we 
can only be witnessing antisemitism in practice, 
even if the perpetrators would characterize their 
speech and actions otherwise: for example, as 
“politically motivated” hostility and violence 
towards supporters of Israel who are, they 
might argue, only coincidentally Jewish. This 
line of argument has indeed been maintained 
even where violence is targeted not at an Israeli 
or pro-Israeli target but at a Jewish place of 
worship in a European country.12 Under such 
circumstances, there is little sense in asking 
whether Jews are being conceived as a proxy for 
Israel or whether Israel is being conceived as a 
proxy for Jews. Classically antisemitic discourse 
is used to delegitimize Israel, and discourse on 
Israel is used to legitimize what would otherwise 
be easily recognizable as antisemitic behavior.
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Both change and continuity are therefore 
involved. One of the boldest theories of con-
tinuity has been put forward by Thorsten 
Fuchshuber. He argues that both “antisemi-
tism” in the sense in which the word is most 
commonly understood—that is, as a term cov-
ering the racialized Jew-hate which emerged in 
nineteenth-century Germany and the related 
exterminationist Jew-hate associated with the 
Holocaust—and twenty-first-century “anti- 
Zionism”—that is, the seemingly democratic 
Jew-hate which today uses the language of 
human rights to condemn the most visible and 
important Jewish collectivity (i.e., the state of 
Israel)—are simply two successive strategies. 
Each is adapted to a different social reality, for 
the purpose of (a) inflicting the maximum pos-
sible harm to Jews and (b) rationalizing such 
harm in a manner acceptable to wider society.13 
As Fuchshuber writes, “antizionism is a new 
form of Judeophobia only in the sense that 
what stands between the Jew haters and their 
enemy (the Jew) has changed,” such that “Israel 
is merely the new obstacle that stands between 
Judeophobes and the fulfilment of their unsub-
stantiated hatred against the Jews.”14 
Fuchshuber’s arguments could be taken to 
suggest a level of essentialism and intentional-
ity that might be regarded as controversial. But 
one can make a similar point whilst avoiding 
such implications: for example, David Seymour 
argues that antisemitism and antizionism 
should be understood as analogous ideologies 
(in Arendt’s sense).15 Either way, it is insuffi-
cient simply to observe that negative attitudes 
towards Israel tend to co-occur with negative 
attitudes towards Jews qua Jews: if the division 
of these attitudes into distinct and nonoverlap-
ping sets is arbitrary and unstable, then there is 
no reason to assume that attitudes from differ-
ent sets would not co-occur.
Although we note Fuchshuber’s use of the 
term “Judeophobia” to represent that which is 
constant between religious anti-Judaism, racial-
ized and exterminationist antisemitism, and 
contemporary antizionism, we retain the term 
“antisemitism” as the most widely accepted 
term for all these forms of Jew-hate, using the 
term “antizionist antisemitism” to refer to the 
form of anti-Jewish ideology which has been 
articulated in relation to the state of Israel. To 
measure the prevalence of that ideology in a 
consistent and replicable manner, a standard 
instrument will be required. However, existing 
questionnaire instruments for the measurement 
of antisemitism are founded on an understand-
ing of antisemitism which regards as paradig-
matic only those anti-Jewish attitudes which 
predate the foundation of the state of Israel. 
That is why the experimental and survey-based 
studies referred to in the first paragraph of this 
section impose an a priori distinction between 
Israel and Jews when such a distinction clearly 
has no stable psychological reality in the minds 
of those who hate either—as the findings of 
those studies must be recognized to suggest.
In constructing and piloting the AzAs 
(antizionist antisemitism) scale, we have 
attempted to move on from the above by 
constructing and piloting a set of statements 
designed to elicit antisemitic attitudes (or 
their negation) with reference to Israel and its 
supporters.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AZAS SCALE
Questionnaire items were initially devel-
oped through brainstorming between the two 
authors, each of whom has substantial experi-
ence of qualitative research on contemporary 
antisemitism. Following discussion with other 
antisemitism experts and practitioners, these 
were incorporated in an online questionnaire 
hosted on Google Forms. 
During the construction of the online 
questionnaire, it was recognized that the over-
whelmingly antisemitic nature of most of the 
statements could make completing it into a 
distressing experience for Jewish respondents. 
For that reason, a number of ambivalent and 
pro-Israeli items were included for balance. 
The resulting questionnaire was tested on a 
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convenience sample of 340 volunteers from 
King’s College London (mostly staff and post-
graduate students). Our suspicion that the 
questionnaire could be potentially distressing 
for Jewish volunteers was confirmed by a com-
plaint received from a member of staff who 
stated that the questions made her feel person-
ally uncomfortable. After discussion, the staff 
member in question explained that her response 
had been triggered by her recognition of most 
of the anti-Israeli statements in the question-
naire as ideas that she had had to argue against 
when confronted by antisemitism.
Weakly correlated items were removed fol-
lowing this initial test, as were two items relat-
ing to tactics used by the BDS movement. This 
was because potential users of the scale who 
were consulted during the development pro-
cess expressed concern that including indirect 
reference to BDS within the scale might make 
it less useful for future studies investigating the 
complexity of relationships between BDS and 
antizionist antisemitism. Antizionist antisem-
itism could be a motivation underlying BDS, 
whether conscious, unconscious, or partly 
conscious; it could be a necessary characteris-
tic of BDS; it could be an empirical outcome 
of BDS; it could manifest itself in the affective 
order required by the BDS movement; it might 
be associated with support for some aspects of 
BDS but not with support for others. Treating 
BDS tactics as a component of antizionist 
antisemitism would make it harder to investi-
gate these possibilities on an empirical level.
One item was re-worded in order to inter-
nationalize the scale by removing references to 
Britain, while another was reworded in order to 
produce a balance of protrait and contrait (i.e. 
positively and negatively keyed) items. This 
process resulted in the six items listed in table 1, 
which are intended for presentation in a random 
order (rather than as here, where protrait items 
are presented first). Although the items can also 
be used to assess the prevalence of specific atti-
tudes represented by individual statements, our 
recommendation is that scores for all six should 
Table 1 Questionnaire items
Item Statement
AzAs-1 Israel and its supporters are a bad 
influence on our democracy
AzAs-2 Israel can get away with anything 
because its supporters control the media
AzAs-3 Israel treats the Palestinians like the 
Nazis treated the Jews
AzAs-4 * I am comfortable spending time with 
people who openly support Israel
AzAs-5 * Israel makes a positive contribution to 
the world
AzAs-6 * Israel is right to defend itself against 
those who want to destroy it
* Negatively keyed
also be averaged to provide an overall score for 
each respondent completing the questionnaire. 
This is important in distinguishing individuals 
whose thinking on the issue of Israel is dom-
inated by antisemitism from those who may 
have agreed with only a single protrait item, 
or disagreed with a single contrait item, while 
responding in contrary fashion to all the rest. 
3. FACE VALIDITY OF THE SIX ITEMS
AzAs-1: Israel and Its Supporters are a Bad 
Influence on Our Democracy
Conspiracy fantasy is the bedrock of antisemi-
tism. It portrays Jews as globally powerful and 
makes Jews a symbol of universal threat. To 
agree with AzAs-1 in a Western country such as 
the US or the UK is to agree that Israel could 
somehow be a threat not only in areas where it 
is a dominant power, but to “us all.”
This question also introduces the notion of 
“supporters of Israel”—a category referred to 
in several AzAs items. Obviously, not all sup-
porters of Israel are Jewish and not all Jews are 
supporters of Israel. But if antisemitic attitudes 
are imputed onto the category “supporters of 
Israel,” then that is at the very least an indica-
tor of antisemitism, because Israel is the world’s 
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only Jewish state. Furthermore, a recent survey 
of British Jews found that ninety percent sup-
port Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, while 
ninety-three percent consider Israel to be inte-
gral to their identity as Jews.16 This means that 
if “supporters of Israel” are seen as a threat, then 
the majority of Jews will be seen as a threat.
AzAs-2: Israel Can Get Away with Anything 
Because Its Supporters Control the Media
Antisemitic conspiracy fantasy often manifests 
itself in the form of allegations that Jews control 
and corrupt minds, especially through control 
of the media industry and the news agenda. 
Many of the kinds of human rights abuses 
which anti-Israel campaigners attribute to Israel 
have their origin in antisemitic superstitions 
about Jews. Today, supporters of Israel may be 
treated as a proxy for Jews, and vice versa, in the 
antisemitic imagination.
To agree with AzAs-2 is therefore to treat 
Jews as having precisely the same kinds of 
power and villainy that antisemites have histor-
ically ascribed to Jews. This is not refuted by 
the observation that such power and villainy is 
at the same stroke ascribed to those non-Jews 
who join with the majority of Jews in support-
ing Israel. Indeed, antisemitic conspiracy theory 
has from the outset implicated non-Jews such 
as Freemasons and Bolsheviks in the supposed 
international Jewish conspiracy.17 
AzAs-3: Israel Treats the Palestinians like the 
Nazis Treated the Jews
Holocaust inversion, which constructs Jews as 
Nazis, is wholly unjustified and clearly antise-
mitic.18 “Nazi,” as a term, connotes the abso-
lute evil associated with the ideal and defining 
type of modern and industrialized genocide. 
Applying this epithet to Jews, who were the 
key victims of Nazi genocide, aggravates the 
connotation. And this applies no less when it 
is applied to the Jewish state. The International 
Holocaust Research Association explicitly 
recognizes “[d]rawing comparisons of contem-
porary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis” as one 
of several examples of potentially antisemitic 
discourse.19 It has further been argued that such 
comparisons are “almost always” antisemitic, as 
“it is difficult, if not impossible to imagine a 
rigorous, rather than a polemical-emotional use 
of the Nazi analogy.”20
AzAs-4: I Am Comfortable Spending Time with 
People Who Openly Support Israel
In the light of the above discussion of the term 
“supporters of Israel,” it is clear that to disagree 
with AzAs-4 would indicate a disinclination to 
spend time with the overwhelming majority of 
Jews. The fact that Jews may be allowed to dis-
avow Israel in the hope of making themselves 
socially acceptable does not nullify this conclu-
sion. Indeed, requiring Jews to disavow or to 
keep quiet about an important aspect of their 
Jewishness before admitting them to non-Jewish 
society would in itself be a deeply antisemitic 
practice.
AzAs-5: Israel Makes a Positive Contribution  
to the World
This statement is simplified from one of those 
used in the Jewish Policy Research Institute’s 
study of attitudes to Jews and Israel.21 Providing 
respondents with an opportunity to express a 
positive view of Israel increases the scale’s power 
to distinguish those whose thinking is influ-
enced by antizionist antisemitism from those 
whose thinking is not.
To deny that any particular country makes a 
positive contribution to the world would likely 
be interpreted as bigoted. It is possible that 
some individuals may disagree with AzAs-5 out 
of ignorance, or because of some other preju-
dice (for example, a belief that no country but 
their own could make a positive contribution). 
However, throughout history, one of the cen-
tral accusations against the Jews has been that 
they are unproductive and parasitical. Where 
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this accusation is applied to the Jewish state, the 
implication of antisemitism is clear.
AzAs-6: Israel is Right to Defend Itself against 
Those Who Want to Destroy It
Around half of world Jewry is resident in Israel. 
Denying Israel the right to self-defense would 
in practice amount to endorsement of a second 
Holocaust.
4. PILOT STUDY
The six-item instrument was piloted on a sample 
of Mechanical Turk workers in the US,22 with 
the administration of the questionnaire being 
managed through the TurkPrime platform on 
22 July (N = 122).23 See Appendix 1 for demo-
graphic characteristics of the sample (collected by 
TurkPrime using the platform’s own demographic 
categories) and for participants’ self-reported 
political positions (collected through the ques-
tionnaire). Political positions were expressed on 
a five-point left-right scale, where 1 corresponds 
to “left” and 5 corresponds to “right.” As with 
the development version, the questionnaire was 
hosted on Google Forms, with informed consent 
being obtained and with no identifying informa-
tion being available to the researchers.
Altogether, ninety-seven of the respondents 
rated all six items, and just three did not rate 
any items at all (where not rating an item means 
responding “Don’t know,” as it was not possi-
ble to skip items and still complete the survey). 
Table 2 gives percentage rates of agreement and 
disagreement, as well as total numbers of rat-
ings, for each item (the percentage choosing the 
option “neither agree nor disagree” is not given 
but can be inferred). Table 3 gives Spearman’s 
coefficient of correlation for each pair of items.
Each respondent was assigned an AzAs score, 
calculated as the mean of all his or her responses 
on a five-point scale (where “Strongly disagree” 
is 1 and “Strongly agree” is 5 for AzAs-1, AzAs-2, 
and AzAs-3, and the reverse is true for the 
remaining items). “Don’t know” responses were 
ignored. Table 4 shows the Spearman correlation 
between each item and the overall AzAs score. 
Table 2. Agreement and disagreement with items
Total agree (%) Total disagree (%) N
AzAs-1 29 45 114
AzAs-2 24 51 108
AzAs-3 34 39 104
AzAs-4 61 11 114
AzAs-5 47 19 114
AzAs-6 72 10 117
Table 3. Item-item correlations
AzAs-1 AzAs-2 AzAs-3 AzAs-4 AzAs-5 AzAs-6
AzAs-1 1.00 0.36 0.61 –0.57 –0.58 –0.54
AzAs-2 0.36 1.00 0.51 –0.19 –0.33 –0.25
AzAs-3 0.61 0.51 1.00 –0.42 –0.48 –0.47
AzAs-4 –0.57 –0.19 –0.42 1.00 0.55 0.66
AzAs-5 –0.58 –0.33 –0.48 0.55 1.00 0.55
AzAs-6 –0.54 –0.25 –0.47 0.66 0.55 1.00
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As it shows, AzAs-1 was the most strongly cor-
related (that is, the most predictive of responses 
to all other items), and AzAs-2 was the least 
strongly correlated. However, even AzAs-2 was 
well-correlated with the overall score. Table 5 
shows standard measures of internal reliability 
for the AzAs scale, as well as the mean and 
standard deviation for AzAs scores for the 
sample as a whole. Both on Cronbach’s alpha 
and Guttman’s lambda-6, the scale achieved an 
acceptable level of internal reliability.24 This is 
evidence, independent of the above arguments 
for face validity, that the six items may indeed 
be treated as measuring a single trait. 
The mean AzAs score for the sample was 
below the theoretical midpoint of 3.00, indi-
cating that most respondents reject antisemitic 
antizionism. However, the theoretical midpoint 
was well within one standard deviation of the 
mean, indicating that acceptance of antisemitic 
antizionism was far from unusual. Figure 1 is 
a histogram showing the overall distribution of 
AzAs scores, and figure 2 is a violin plot showing 
the distribution of AzAs scores for respondents 
at each level of subjective left-right political 
identification (horizontal lines represent median 








Table 5: Internal reliability, mean, and standard 






scores). Examination of figure 2 suggests that 
there is no monotonic component to the rela-
tionship between subjective political position 
and antisemitic antizionism within this sample. 
In other words, respondents who think of them-
selves as being on the left appeared neither more 
nor less likely to agree with antisemitic antizion-
ist statements than respondents who think of 
themselves as being on the right. However, very 
few members of this particular sample identified 
themselves with the political right.
5. CONCLUSION
The AzAs scale may be used both to measure 
the overall appeal of antisemitic attitudes as 
expressed in relation to Israel and its support-
ers and in order to judge how widespread cer-












Figure 1. Overall distribution of AzAs scores
Figure 2. Distribution of AzAs scores for 
respondents at each level of subjective left-right 
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a worldwide Jewish conspiracy remains the 
most important and dangerous of antisemitic 
attitudes, so it is important that we are able 
to detect such ideation even when couched 
in such a way as to avoid explicit reference to 
Jews qua Jews. As such, the AzAs scale will be a 
useful research tool in studying contemporary 
antisemitism and its relation to other social, 
political, and psychological phenomena.
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TECHNICAL NOTE
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APPENDIX 
Table 6: Demographic characteristics of 
respondents, where available (collected by 
TurkPrime)
Demographic % N
Gender: Female 43 50
Gender: Male 57 67
Birthdate: 1979 or earlier 23 26
Birthdate: 1980 or later 77 87
‘Race’: White/Caucasian 79 90
‘Race’: other 21 24
Table 7: Left-right identification  
of respondents
% N
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